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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Josette Marie Horton asserts the district court erred when it denied her motion to
suppress, because the traffic stop of her car was not justified by reasonable suspicion and
therefore violated her constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
The arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop, because
Ms. Horton’s expired out-of-state registration did not violate the Idaho motor vehicle statutes on
renewal of registration or violations of registration provisions. The definitions of the terms used
in those statutes mean the statutes only apply to vehicles registered under the laws of this state.
But the district court, after it determined not allowing Idaho law enforcement officers to stop
vehicles with expired out-of-state registration was “absurd,” revised the statutes to cover vehicles
registered outside Idaho. The district court therefore violated the rule of statutory interpretation
that prohibits revising an unambiguous statute because it would produce absurd results.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In support of her motion to suppress, Ms. Horton asserted there was no reasonable
suspicion to justify the traffic stop of her car with expired Washington State registration, for a
violation of the Idaho statutes on renewal of registration or violation of registration provisions.
She asserted those statutes did not apply to her car registered in Washington, because the
definitions of the terms used in the statutes meant the statutes only applied to vehicles registered
in Idaho. (See Tr. Apr. 7, 2017 (hereinafter, Tr.) p.45, L.3 – p.47, L.24.) The district court
stated Ms. Horton’s assertion that Idaho law enforcement officers could not stop an out-of-state
vehicle for expired registration was “absurd.”

(See Tr. p.57, Ls.6-9.)
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The district court

determined the officer had reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop after seeing the expired
Washington registration on Ms. Horton’s car. (See Tr. p.57, L.13 – p.58, L.21.)
Thus, the district court denied the motion to suppress. (Tr. p.57, Ls.21-22.) Ms. Horton
subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to felony possession of a controlled substance1 and
felony major contraband, 2 preserving her right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress.
(See R. pp.51-53.)
The charges against Ms. Horton stemmed from the traffic stop. After the arresting
officer, Idaho State Police Trooper Seth Green, stopped Ms. Horton’s car, she admitted to having
a marijuana pipe, and the officer detained her and found methamphetamine in the car. (See
R. pp.7-8.) Once the officer arrested Ms. Horton and booked her into jail, another officer
searched her and found more methamphetamine on her person.3 (See R. pp.8-9.)
Ms. Horton’s motion to suppress asserted the warrantless traffic stop was unlawful and in
violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the
Idaho Constitution. (R. pp.32-33.) In the memorandum in support of the motion to suppress, she
asserted the officer had no reasonable suspicion for the warrantless traffic stop. (R. p.37.) She
cited State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109 (2013), where the Idaho Supreme Court held: “Idaho
Code § 49-428 requires that a vehicle registered in Idaho display both front and rear license
plates. This requirement does not extend to vehicles registered in other states.” (R. p.39.) In

1

I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1).
I.C. § 18-2510(3).
3
Trooper Green arrested Ms. Horton for felony possession of a controlled substance,
misdemeanor eluding, and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. (See R., p.8.) At the
jail, after administering field sobriety tests, the officer also arrested her for driving under the
influence. (See R., p.8.) At the end of the motion to suppress hearing, the district court stated,
“I’m not going to deal with the eluding issue, even though it was raised and discussed. It was
not made part of the motion to suppress.” (Tr. p.58, Ls.13-15.)
2

2

light of Morgan, Ms. Horton asserted Idaho law enforcement officers have no jurisdiction to
enforce the vehicle registration laws of other states. (R. p.39.) She asserted the officer had no
authorization to enforce the vehicle registration laws of Washington, and thus the traffic stop was
unreasonable. (See R. p.40.)
During the hearing on the motion to suppress, Trooper Green testified that, around
midnight in Coeur d’Alene, he saw a car without a front license plate, which accelerated and
turned sharply when he went to investigate whether it was registered in Idaho. (See Tr. p.10, L.4
– p.11, L.11.) The officer testified he made a U-turn, followed the car until it stopped and
parked, and turned his front lights on and pulled up behind it. (See Tr. p.11, L.12 – p.12, L.19.)
He testified he turned his lights on and pulled up behind the car because it “was displaying
expired tabs.” (Tr. p.12, Ls.20-23.) The officer was able to see the rear license plate of the car
was issued out of Washington. (Tr. p.12, L.24 – p.13, L.17.) Trooper Green testified he thought
the car’s expired Washington registration was a violation of I.C. § 49-430, the renewal of
registration statute. (See Tr. p.13, Ls.15-24.) While he did not issue a citation for the expired
registration, he spoke with the driver of the car, Ms. Horton, about it. (See Tr. p.13, L.25 – p.14,
L.22.)
The State contended section 49-430 was distinguishable from section 49-428, the display
of license plates statute at issue in Morgan, because other states could require only the display of
a rear license plate, while all states required registration of their vehicles. (See Tr. p.42, Ls.715.) The district court inquired if the appropriate statute here could have been I.C. § 49-456, the
statute on violations of registration provisions, and not section 49-430. (See Tr. p.44, Ls.6-9.)
The State argued there was a legal basis for the stop under either section 49-430 or section 49456. (See Tr. p.44, Ls.10-22.)

3

When asked by the district court, Ms. Horton confirmed her assertion was that an Idaho
law enforcement officer could not stop an out-of-state vehicle with expired registration.
(Tr. p.45, Ls.3-7.) Ms. Horton asserted, “there’s no Idaho law that forbade[] an out-of-state
vehicle from having expired registration. The Idaho statutes, the 400s, all deal with Idaho
registration specifically.” (Tr. p.46, Ls.3-6.)
The district court asked about section 49-456, and Ms. Horton replied it did not apply to
out-of-state vehicles for “the same reason that 49-428 doesn’t apply to out-of-state vehicles:
Because the statute is only written and only directed towards Idaho vehicles.” (Tr. p.47, Ls.717.) Ms. Horton continued, stating “these statutes dealing with registration were written for and
are only directed towards Idaho registered vehicles. The Idaho legislature did not write the
registration statute and intend for it to apply to out-of-state vehicles.” (Tr. p.47, Ls.22-24.)
In its ruling, the district court determined the Morgan case was limited to its facts. (See
Tr. p.56, L.14 – p.57, L.5.) The district court then stated, “I think it is absurd to believe or to
accept the notion that law enforcement officers in Idaho cannot stop an out-of-state vehicle with
expired registration.” (Tr. p.57, Ls.6-9.) The district court determined, “[t]hat would indicate a
violation of the—of Idaho law, whether it’s found in Idaho Code Section 49-430 or 49-456 or
some other code section that we haven’t discussed.” (Tr. p.57, Ls.9-12.)
According to the district court, “[i]t is required that vehicles operating in Idaho have
current registration, and I think that any law enforcement officer would have reasonable,
articulable suspicion for conducting a traffic stop when they perceive a vehicle with expired
registration tabs.” (Tr. p.57, Ls.13-15.) The district court found the officer, who testified “that
as he made the turn, he perceived that the license plate was from Washington, he could see that

4

the tabs were expired,” was credible. 4 (See Tr. p.57, L.19 – p.58, L.12.) Thus, the district court
determined the officer “had reasonable, articulable suspicion in perceiving the expired tabs and
conducting the stop, turning on his lights after that.” (Tr. p.58, Ls.15-21.) The district court
denied Ms. Horton’s motion to suppress. (Tr. p.58, Ls.21-22.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement that preserved her right to appeal the denial of the motion to
suppress, Ms. Horton agreed to plead guilty to the charged offenses. (See R. pp.51-53, 57-59.)
The district court imposed a unified sentence of six years, with three years, for possession of a
controlled substance, and a concurrent unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed, for
major contraband. (R. pp.54-56.) The district court retained jurisdiction. (R., p.55.)
Ms. Horton filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment – Retained
Jurisdiction. (R. pp.60-63.)

4

Ms. Horton had also asserted the officer could not have seen the expired registration in the time
between turning and activating his lights. (See Tr. p.51, L.20 – p.52, L.21.) The district court
found the officer could have perceived the expired registration in that time. (See Tr. p.57, L.19 –
p.58, L.10.)
5

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Horton’s motion to suppress, because the traffic stop
violated her constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Horton’s Motion To Suppress, Because The
Traffic Stop Was Not Justified By Reasonable Suspicion And Therefore Violated Her
Constitutional Right To Be Free From Unreasonable Searches And Seizures
A.

Introduction
Ms. Horton asserts the district court erred when it denied her motion to suppress. The

traffic stop was not justified by reasonable suspicion and therefore violated her constitutional
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
The district court determined Trooper Green “had reasonable articulable suspicion in
perceiving the expired tabs and conducting the stop . . . .” (Tr. p.58, Ls.18-21.) However, the
officer did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop, because the expired
Washington State registration did not violate I.C. §§ 49-430 or 49-456. As Ms. Horton asserted
before the district court (see Tr. p.46, L.2 – p.47, L.24), the definitions of the terms used in
sections 49-430 and 49-456 mean the statutes do not apply to vehicles registered outside Idaho.
By revising the statutes to cover vehicles registered outside Idaho, the district court violated the
rule of statutory interpretation that prohibits revising an unambiguous statute because it would
produce absurd results.
Because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion of a violation of sections 49-430 or
49-456, the officer’s traffic stop of Ms. Horton was not justified. The traffic stop was unlawful
and violated her constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus,
the district court erred when it denied Ms. Horton’s motion to suppress.
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B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review for a motion to suppress is bifurcated. An appellate court defers

to the trial court’s findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous, and freely reviews
the trial court’s application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Hankey,
134 Idaho 844, 846 (2000).
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which an appellate court exercises
free review. Stout v. Key Training Corp., 144 Idaho 195, 196 (2007).

C.

The Officer Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To Justify The Traffic Stop
Ms. Horton asserts the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho
Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833
(2002). “Evidence obtained in violation of the [Fourth Amendment] generally may not be used
as evidence against the victim of the illegal government action.” State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,
810-11 (2009). “This rule, known as the exclusionary rule, applies to evidence obtained directly
from the illegal government action and to evidence discovered through the exploitation of the
original illegality, or the fruit of the poisonous tree.” Id. at 811. Similarly, evidence obtained in
violation of Article I, § 17 is generally not admissible under Idaho’s independent exclusionary
rule. See State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511 (2012).
“Any warrantless search or seizure of a citizen is presumptively unreasonable unless it
falls within certain specific and well-delineated exceptions.” Halen, 136 Idaho at 833 (citing
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966)). “When a warrantless search or seizure is
challenged by a defendant, the State bears the burden to show that a recognized exception to the
warrant requirement is applicable.” Id.

8

“Traffic stops constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Henage, 143
Idaho 655, 658 (2007).

Because traffic stops are limited in scope and duration, they are

analogous to an investigative detention and analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). Thus, a traffic stop is
permissible “when justified by an officer’s reasonable articulable suspicion that a person has
committed, or is about to commit, a crime.” See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811. “Reasonable
suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences that can be
drawn from those facts.” Id. “Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is evaluated
based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of the
stop.” Id.

1.

The Expired Washington Registration Did Not Violate Sections 49-430 Or 49-456

Ms. Horton asserts the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop,
because the expired Washington registration did not violate sections 49-430 or 49-456. “The
seizure of a vehicle’s occupants in order to investigate a traffic violation is a ‘reasonable seizure’
under the Fourth Amendment so long as the seizing officer had reasonable suspicion that a
violation had occurred.” State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 608 (2016) (quoting Rodriguez v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015)). Here, the State offered two justifications for the traffic
stop, namely that Ms. Horton’s car was in violation of sections 49-430 or 49-456. (See Tr. p.44,
Ls.10-22.)
The district court determined an out-of-state vehicle with expired registration “would
indicate a violation . . . of Idaho law, whether it’s found in Idaho Code Section 49-430 or 49-456
or some other code section that we haven’t discussed.” (Tr. p.57, Ls.9-12.) Further, the district
court determined, “[i]t is required that vehicles operating in Idaho have current registration, and I
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think that any law enforcement officer would have reasonable, articulable suspicion for
conducting a traffic stop when they perceive a vehicle with expired registration tabs.” (Tr. p.57,
Ls.13-18.)
Ms. Horton asserts the definitions of the terms used in sections 49-430 and 49-456 mean
those statutes do not apply to vehicles registered outside Idaho. The Idaho Supreme Court has
held, “[t]he interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the statute; those
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed
as a whole.” Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893 (2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but
simply follows the law as written.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

“A statute is

ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable construction.” Id. at 896
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The Verska Court also held, “we have never revised or voided an unambiguous statute on
the ground that it is patently absurd or would produce absurd results when construed as written,
and we do not have the authority to do so.” Id. “The public policy of legislative enactments
cannot be questioned by the courts and avoided simply because the courts might not agree with
the public policy so announced.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “If the statute as
written is socially or otherwise unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not judicial.” Id. at
893 (internal quotation marks omitted).
More recently, the Idaho Supreme Court has reaffirmed that “[l]egislative definitions of
terms included within a statute control and dictate the meaning of those terms as used in the
statute.” Mayer v. TPC Holdings, Inc., 160 Idaho 223, 226 (2016) (quoting State v. Yzaguirre,
144 Idaho 471, 477 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). As Ms. Horton asserted before
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the district court (see Tr. p.46, Ls.3-16), the 100s section of Title 49 of the Idaho Code defines
the terms used in sections 49-430 and 49-456. See I.C. § 49-101 (“Words and phrases used in
this title are defined in sections 49-102 through 49-127, Idaho Code.”). “Registration” means
“the registration certificate or certificates and license plate or plates issued under the laws of this
state pertaining to the registration of vehicles.” I.C. § 49-119(9) (emphasis added).
The above definition of “registration” controls and dictates the meaning of that term as
used in sections 49-430 and 49-456. See Mayer, 160 Idaho at 226. Section 49-430, titled:
“Registration to be renewed,” provides that “[r]eregistration of vehicles shall be accomplished
annually or by registration period in the same manner as the original registration and upon the
payment of the required fee. The director may extend this date as to individuals, counties or the
state for not the exceed forty-five (45) days for good cause shown.” I.C. § 49-430(1).
Section 49-456, titled: “Violations of registration provisions,” makes it unlawful for any
person “[t]o operate or for the owner to permit the operation upon a highway of any motor
vehicle, trailer or semitrailer which is not registered and which does not have attached and
displayed the license plates assigned to it for the current registration year, subject to the
exemptions allowed in sections 49-426, 49-431 and 49-432, Idaho Code.” I.C. § 49-456(1).
Thus, because the Idaho Legislature specifically defined “registration” to mean “the
registration certificate or certificates and license plate or plates issued under the laws of this state
pertaining to the registration of vehicles,” I.C. § 49-119(9), sections 49-430 and 49-456 only
apply to vehicles registered under the laws of this state. See Mayer, 160 Idaho at 226. The
statutes do not apply to a vehicle registered outside Idaho, such as Ms. Horton’s car with its
Washington license plate, because an out-of-state vehicle would not have registration certificates
or license plates issued under the laws of this state. The expired Washington registration did not
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violate sections 49-430 or 49-456. Thus, the officer did not have reasonable suspicion of a
violation of those statutes.

2.

The District Court Violated The Rule Of Statutory Interpretation That Prohibits
Revising An Unambiguous Statute Because It Would Produce Absurd Results

Ms. Horton asserts the district court violated the rule of statutory interpretation that
prohibits revising an unambiguous statute because it would produce absurd results. Rather than
follow the unambiguous language of sections 49-430 and 49-456 as written, the district court
construed the statutes to cover vehicles registered outside Idaho. (See Tr. p.57, Ls.9-18.) The
district court revised the statutes after stating, “I think it is absurd to believe or to accept the
notion that law enforcement officers in Idaho cannot stop an out-of-state vehicle with expired
registration.” (Tr. p.57, Ls.6-9.)
Thus, the district court violated the rule of statutory interpretation that prohibits revising
an unambiguous statute because it would produce absurd results. As discussed above, the Idaho
Supreme Court in Verska held, “we have never revised or voided an unambiguous statute on the
ground that it is patently absurd or would produce absurd results when construed as written, and
we do not have the authority to do so.” Verska, 151 Idaho at 896. “If the statute as written is
socially or otherwise unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not judicial.” 5 Id. at 893.

5

The Idaho Legislature could enact a law requiring out-of-state vehicles to have proper
registration in their state of origin. For example, Arkansas, the state where the car in Morgan
was registered, see Brief of Appellant at 3, 9, State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109 (2013)
(No 38305), 2011 WL 3471424 at *3, 9, has a statute allowing vehicles belonging to
nonresidents of the state to operate in Arkansas, if the owner has complied with all the laws of
the state in which the owner resides with respect to vehicle registration and the display of
registration numbers. See Ark. Code. Ann. §27-14-704(a). Washington State law provides that
its statutes relating to the registration of vehicles and display of license plates and registration
certificates do not apply to vehicles owned by nonresidents, if the owner has complied with the
law requiring the registration of vehicles in the name of the owners in force in the state of
12

The district court here did not have the authority to revise 49-430 and 49-456 as written to avoid
absurd results.
In sum, the district court erred when it denied Ms. Horton’s motion to suppress. Sections
49-430 and 49-456 do not apply to vehicles registered outside Idaho, such as Ms. Horton’s car.
The officer did not have reasonable suspicion of a violation of sections 49-430 or 49-456, or of
any other violation. Thus, the officer’s traffic stop of Ms. Horton was not justified and unlawful.
See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811. The evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful traffic stop, in
violation of Ms. Horton’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures,
may not be used against her. See id. at 810-11; Koivu, 152 Idaho 511. The district court’s order
denying the motion to suppress should be reversed.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Ms. Horton respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district
court’s order of judgment and commitment, reverse the order which denied her motion to
suppress, and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 14th day of March, 2018.

__________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

residence, and the license plate is displayed on the vehicle substantially as required in
Washington. See Wash. Rev. Code § 46.16A.160(1)(a) & (b).
13
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